



In July 1965, the Governor of Ohio signed into law a post-convic-
tion remedy statute.' The purpose of the statute is to serve as a sub-
stitute for habeas corpus and to insure a corrective remedy for persons
convicted in proceedings which did not conform to constitutional
standards.2 Section 2953.21 should also ease the strain of the courts
situated in the area where the correctional institutions are located,
since the motion under the new statute is made to the sentencing court,
not the courts of the county where the prisoner is confined.' The
administrative advantages of such a procedure are persuasive; it will
enable those connected with the trial proceedings to testify where it
is both more convenient and inexpensive.
At first glance, there may be at least two drawbacks to section
2953.21. The first concerns the "finality" factor, which centers on
the concept that at some time litigation should come to an end.4 The
second drawback centers on the fact that the hearing is held before
the same court that convicted the defendant; quite possibly before the
same judge and prosecutor who convicted him. If the claim is that the
conviction is unconstitutional because of an impropriety on the part
of the judge, will the court admit that it made a mistake?
Prior to the enactment of the statute, a prisoner seeking relief
by means of collateral attack would have made use of habeas corpus.
Section 2953.21 should minimize the use of habeas corpus by serving
as a substitute for the writ in many areas. While it is too early to
determine the exact scope of the new statute, the federal courts have
used a similar, although not identical, statute since 1948-section 2255
of title 28 of the United States Code.' The purpose of this comment is
to analyze two particular areas of section 2255 in order to establish
guidelines for the possible interpretation of the new Ohio statute.
1 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2953.21-.24 (Page Supp. 1965).
2 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.21 (Page Supp. 1965) states in part: "that there was
such a denial or infringement of his rights as to render the judgment void or voidable
under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States . "
3 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.21 (Page Supp. 1965) states in part: "A prisoner ...
may file a verified petition at any time in the court which imposed sentence... 1
4 See Amsterdam, "Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment," 112 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 378, 383-84 (1964), for a discussion of the various aspects of the finality factor.
5 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1959). For text of statute see Comment, "The Federal Ap-
proach-Scope and Availability of Section 2255," 27 Ohio St. L.J. 302, 303 n.3 (1966).
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS UNDER SECTION 2255
This section will concentrate on the first of the four grounds of
relief set out in section 2255, i.e., "that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States." Ohio
lawyers should bear in mind that these grounds are based upon rights
guaranteed by the federal constitution and should be recognized in
Ohio under the new statute, since federal relief establishes the
minimum requirements of due process.
Another factor which should be noted is that constitutional rights,
like other rights, can be waived. For example, while a denial of the
right to counsel is a ground for collateral attack, one may validly waive
his right to such counsel and thereby deprive himself of a ground for
relief. The classic statement on what constitutes a proper waiver is
found in Johnson v. Zerbst:8 "a waiver is ordinarily an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." This
is still the controlling standard.7 Under this formulation, waiver may
not be implied from a silent record, rather, the record must show, or
there must be an averment and evidence which shows, that the accused
intelligently and understandingly waived.' Similarly, waiver should
not be implied by the bare failure to act.' Understandably, the cases
silently illustrate that courts are more willing to find waiver of con-
stitutional rights when the petitioner was represented by counsel at
the trial and failed to raise the issue there or on direct appeal.1
The following list of grounds is not intended to be exhaustive.
However, it is hoped that by comparing grounds which are sufficient
with those which are insufficient, the reader will be able to better
evaluate the merits of any possible ground raised for collateral relief.
A. Insufficient Grounds
1. Error in the Indictment or Information
In most cases, procedural errors concerning the indictment or the
information are not treated as grounds for vacation of the prisoner's
sentence in a section 2255 proceeding, but must be raised on appeal,
6 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See also Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957);
Walker v. Peppersack, 316 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1963); United States v. Reincke, 229 F.
Supp. 132 (D. Conn. 1964).
7 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
8 Carneby v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
9 See United States v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1964). See generally Cobb v.
Balcom, 339 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Rundle, 337 F.2d 268 (3d Cir.
1964); Spaulding v. Taylor, 234 F. Supp. 747 (D. Kan. 1964).
10 See generally Starrs, "The Post-Conviction Hearing Act-1949-1960 and Beyond,"
10 De Paul L. Rev. 397, 407 (1961).
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unless exceptional circumstances are shown."' The reason for this
rule can be understood by remembering that the function of section
2255 is to serve as a substitute for habeas corpus and not to expand
the grounds for collateral attack. Under habeas corpus, slight defects
in the indictment were not a ground for collateral attack."2
This rule is subject to certain exceptions, such as when the indict-
ment or information shows that the court lacked jurisdiction of the
prisoner, 3 or when the indictment or information fails to charge an
offense under any reasonable construction14 or charges a nonexistent
federal offense. 15 A further exception is when the indictment charges
the defendant with a federal crime, but shows on its face that the
defendant did not commit the crime.'6
It should be noted that it is rare for any of these exceptional cir-
cumstances to occur. This is especially true when the defendant was
represented by counsel, and there was no objection to the indictment
at the trial or on appeal.' Perhaps the real reason for refusing to allow
this ground is that if the objection had been made at an early stage,
the error could have been corrected and the result of the case would
not have been materially changed.'" Of course, an indictment which
indicated that the statute of limitations had run, and that the defendant
could no longer be prosecuted, could not be sufficiently corrected.' 9
11 See, e.g., Stegall v. United States, 259 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1958) (indictment);
Barnes v. United States, 197 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1952) (information).
12 In Knewal v. Eagan, 268 U.S. 442 (1925), the Supreme Court gave the reasons
for this rule at 446:
It is fundamental that a court upon which is conferred jurisdiction to try an
offense, has jurisdiction to determine whether or not that offense is charged or
proved. Otherwise, every judgment of conviction would be subject to collateral
attack and review on habeas corpus on the ground that no offense was charged
or proved. It has been uniformly held by the Court that the suffidency of the
indictment cannot be reviewed in habeas corpus proceedings.
13 Hilderbrand v. United States, 261 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1958), United States v. Hanis,
133 F. Supp. 796 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
14 Gibson v. United States, 244 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1957).
15 Barnes v. Hunter, 188 F.2d 86, 89 (10th Cir. 1951).
16 Ibid. For example, if the defendant is charged with transporting in interstate
commerce stolen property of the value of $5,000, and the indictment alleges that the
value of the property in question was $2,500, the indictment would not state an offense.
17 E.g., United States v. Nicherson, 211 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1954); Lucas v. United
States, 158 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1946).
18 The doctrine of waiver is important in this area. Should the defendant plead
guilty, he waives any defect in the indictment. Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d
707 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847 (1958).
19 Askins v. United States, 251 F.2d 909, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (dictum).
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2. Error in Rulings on Evidence
Except in possibly extreme circumstances, the question of the
sufficiency or inadmissibility of the evidence cannot be raised on
a motion to vacate the sentence, but must be raised on direct appeal. 20
Thus, the scope of complaints concerning the evidence is somewhat
narrower under a section 2255 proceeding than on appeal. This is
due to the fact that the regularity of the proceedings, not the guilt
of the accused, is being tested in a section 2255 proceeding. It would
seem that the only instances when the insufficiency or inadmissibility
of the evidence could be urged would be those cases when the use of
such evidence amounted to a denial of due process.
3. The Conduct of the Trial Judge
Normally, the conduct of the trial judge is insufficient to be a
ground for collateral attack unless his conduct constitutes plain
(prejudicial) error,2 such as refusing the accused counsel or influenc-
ing the defendant to plead guilty.22 While it is axiomatic that the right
to a fair trial is guaranteed by the federal constitution and that this
rule includes an impartial judge,23 impartiality requires only an
absence of actual bias in the trial of the case. 4 This means that a judge
is not disqualified to sit in a criminal proceeding merely because he
has an opinion as to the guilt of the accused, or is convinced of his
guilt.2
5
The conduct of the trial judge is also related to the constitutional
right to a fair and impartial jury. The problem is presented in cases
where there is considerable publicity of the trial from the newspapers
20 Malone v. United States, 257 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1958) (dictum).
21 Fennell v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 451 (N.. Okla. 1964), aff'd, 339 F.2d 920
(10th Cir. 1965). A "plain" error is an error which affects substantial rights; as opposed
to a "harmless" error, which is one that does not affect substantial rights. See Fed. Rules
Crim. P. 52. The court in Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561, 569 (9th Cir. 1955),
stated: "[Alll error is either 'Harmless' or 'Plain' depending upon whether it affects
substantial rights. It cannot be disputed Plain' error and prejudicial error mean the same
thing, as prejudicial error is error which affects substantial rights."
22 Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1957).
23 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 US. 510, 532 (1927).
24 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
25 See Hendrix v. Hand, 312 F.2d 147 (10th Cir. 1962); United States v. Shotwell
Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 1961), aff'd, 371 U.S. 341 (1963); United States v.
Mroz, 136 F.2d 221, 224 n.4 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 805 (1943). But see Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927): "Every procedure which would offer a possible tempta-
tion to the average man as a judge ...not to hold the balance nice, dear, and true
between the State and the accused denies the latter due process of law."
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and other news media which presumably creates prejudice against
the defendant in the eyes of the community. 6 In United States v.
Robinson,27 the petition alleged that the defendant was denied a fair
and impartial jury. However, the court found that this ground was
without merit in a section 2255 proceeding and must be raised on
appeal. The court determined that the judge had been careful in the
selection of the jury, and had also given adequate cautionary instruc-
tions to the jury. Moreover, the defendant, who had considerable
education had failed to make use of the other avenues of correcting
the error, if any in fact existed.
The Robinson case points out two of the serious drawbacks of
allowing the denial of an impartial jury as a ground for collateral
relief. First, there are several ways of correcting such errors besides
the use of collateral attack. When the defendant believes that the
pretrial publicity has made it difficult for him to have an impartial
jury, he may move for a change of venue,28 or for a continuance until
the public clamor has subsided.29 When publicity believed to be pre-
judicial occurs during the trial, the defendant can move for a mis-
trial, or request the trial judge to caution the jury to keep an open
mind."0 And, of course, the defendant can perfect an appeal. The
availability of these procedures implies that the defendant waived or
consciously elected not to seek either a different jury, or direct review.
Several facts weigh heavily against one urging this contention for the
first time by means of collateral attack, i.e., that there are several ways
to correct the error, that at some point litigation must come to an end,8 '
and that section 2255 is not a substitute for appeal.
28 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 382 U.S.
916 (1965). See also Estes v. United States, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), which held televising the
defendant's trial over defendant's objections was inherently invalid as violating the due
process clause.
27 143 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Ky. 1956); see also United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d
666 (2d Cir. 1952).
28 In Ohio, on defendant's motion, the trial judge can grant a change of venue to
a distant locale in the same state which is less concerned with the crime. Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2311.38 (Page 1954). See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
29 See Larson v. United States, 275 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1960).
80 Larson v. United States, supra note 29; United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d
666, 668-70 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 965 (1954).
81 See Bowen v. United States, 192 F.2d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1951), where the court
stated: "it is also of the essence: that the government be enabled to control the governed
and to that end that judgments have finality; and that trials, conducted in accordance
with law and ending in conviction, some day be at an end."
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B. Sufficient Grounds
1. The Coerced Plea of Guilty
A coerced plea of guilty is inconsistent with due process of law,
and is a ground for relief under section 2255.82 A defendant has a
right to stand trial and to require the government to establish the
charges against him in accordance with procedural and substantive
due process. Of course, a defendant may obviate the required proof by
pleading guilty, which has the impact of a jury's verdict of guilty.
However, both rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 3
and the interpretations of due process8 4 require the court to accept a
plea of guilty only when such plea is made knowingly and voluntarily.
When a guilty plea is the product of physical or mental coercion,
ignorance, fear, or inadvertence, the plea is void in federal court. 5
82 See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
83 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, provides in part: "the court may refuse to accept a plea
of guilty, and shall not accept the plea without first determining that the plea is made
voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge." This rule is substantially
a restatement of existing law and practice. See Fogus v. United States, 34 F.2d 97 (4th
Cir. 1929). See generally Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 18 U.S.C. (1961)
(rule 11).
84 A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character
of a voluntary act, is void. A conviction based upon such a plea is open to collateral
attack. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962). See Shelton v. United
States, 356 U.S. 26 (1958), reversing 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957) (per curiam); Waley v.
Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Kercheval v.
United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
This should apply to an Ohio conviction by means of the fourteenth amendment.
See Mooney v. Holshan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935). The importance of determining
f the plea was voluntary cannot be overestimated in Ohio. For example, by voluntarily
pleading guilty to the indictment while represented by counsel, the defendant waives
errors or irregularities in preliminary proceedings prior to indictment. Gifford v. Maxwell,
177 Ohio St. 77, 202 N.E.2d 424 (1964). See also Shelton v. Haskins, 176 Ohio St.
296, 199 N.E.2d 598 (1964), which held the prisoner's conviction could not be considered
invalid, although it rested upon evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure, since
defendant entered a plea of guilty and was convicted upon such plea without a trial or
introduction of any evidence. Accord, Poe v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 28, 201 N.E.2d 703
(1964). Similarly, even if an accused is illegally detained after his arrest and during such
detention makes what would be considered a coerced confession, if the accused pleads
guilty, and the confession is not used, the mere fact that the coerced confession existed
does not effect the validity of this subsequent plea of guilty. Caldwell v. Haskins, 176
Ohio St. 261, 199 NE.2d 116 (1964). But the fact that the defendant knows the State
is ready with a coerced confession seems to make the plea something less than voluntary.
Further, an Ohio defendant has the burden of proving that the confession was involuntary.
City of Columbus v. Bosley, 73 Ohio L. Abs. 185, 136 N.E.2d 426 (Ct. App. 1956).
85 See United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), and cases cited
therein.
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There is no one test which a court can use to determine if a plea
is properly made. However, it seems proper for a court to weigh psy-
chological factors which may reasonably be expected to influence one
who is on trial. One must distinguish the cases in this area on the
basis of the source of the coercion. If the coercion results from the
words or acts of a judge, a post-conviction remedy may be more
likely to exist.3"
There are three situations in which the judge takes no active role
in the coercion. The first occurs when the government has convincing
evidence of the accused's guilt, and the accused, with or without the
advice of counsel, pleads guilty. In the absence of evidence that the
defendant was unaware of his rights3 7 or that an expectation of leniency
was induced by the government, the fact that the defendant pleaded
guilty in an attempt for leniency is insufficient for post-conviction
relief.38
A second situation occurs when the government threatens the
defendant and thereby induces the plea,39 or promises leniency.4 Most
courts are in justifiable agreement that in either of these situations,
the plea is involuntary and the conviction void.
A third situation exists where the prosecution offers the defendant
a "deal" in return for a plea of guilty. For example, the prosecutor
may offer to drop certain counts of the indictment or to make recom-
36 One case in point is United States v. Tateo, supra note 35. In that case, there
were several charges against the defendant, including one for kidnapping. After the
government had placed substantial evidence before the court, the district judge con-
sulted with counsel in chambers. At that time, the judge advised defendant's counsel
that if the accused finished the trial and was found guilty, the court would impose a
life sentence on the kidnapping charge and the maximum sentences under the other
charges. When informed of this, the accused entered a plea of guilty. The court then
complied with the formal requirements of rule 11 so that the record reflected that the
plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly. Later, the defendant filed a motion
to vacate his sentence, alleging that the fear of spending the rest of his life in prison
led him to plead guilty, and that this fear, initiated by -the judge's remarks, rendered
his plea of guilty involuntary. The district court held a hearing and determined that
the petitioner was entitled to relief, giving considerable significance to the emotional
impact of the judge's words upon the defendant. The court further reasoned that any
choice the defendant had was severely limited by the judge's statement. Moreover, the
court held that the question of whether the trial court intended to influence the defendant
by his remarks or not was immaterial, because the effect was the same.
37 Watts v. United States, 278 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
38 United States v. Taylor, 303 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1962).
39 See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
40 United States v. Taylor, 303 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v. Lester,
247 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1957).
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mendations for a lighter sentence. Normally, such procedures are not
considered coercive and do not void the plea.4'
2. Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure
Four reasons have been given by the United States Supreme Court
as a basis for the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases: (1)
it provides, the victim with an effective remedy;' (2) it prevents the
government from profiting by its own wrong;43 (3) it preserves the
integrity of the court; 44 and (4) it deters the police from similar
further misconduct.4 Recently, federal courts have parlayed these
reasons in order to grant relief where the claim was predicated upon
an illegal search.46 These decisions, in conjunction with Mapp v. Ohio,'7
and Fay v. Noia,41 show that search and seizure presents a constitu-
tional issue and therefore is a ground for collateral attack.49 Two points
should be noted: first, the courts which have granted relief on this
ground have ignored several earlier decisions to the contrary; 0 and
second, Mapp v. Ohio is to operate prospectively only.5'
41 See generally Schwartz, Professional Responsibility and the Administration of
Criminal justice 27 (1961); Breitel, "Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement," 27 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 427, 432 (1960); Newman, "Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of
Bargain justice," 46 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 780 (1956); Note, "Guilty Plea Bargaining:
Compromises By Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas," 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 865 (1964).
By pleading guilty, the defendant may waive several avenues of defense. See, e.g., Ander-
son v. United States, 338 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1964) (guilty plea waives defense of entrap-
ment); Kennedy v. United States, 259 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1958) (guilty plea waives
failure to arraign); Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 847 (1958) (guilty plea waives illegal arrest and questioning).
42 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961).
43 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483-85 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
44 Id. at 469, 471. See also Irvine v. California, 347 US. 128, 150 (1954) (dissenting
opinion).
45 Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 42, at 686. *
46 Dillon v. Peters, 341 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v. Rundie, 337
F.2d 268 (3d Cir. 1964); United States v. Reincke, 229 F. Supp. 132 (D. Conn. 1964).
47 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
48 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
49 Mapp v. Ohio, suPra note 47, held that illegally seized evidence was inadmissible
in a state court criminal case; the dictum in Fay v. Noia, supra note 48, suggests that
all constitutional issues can be raised by collateral attack.
50 See, e.g., Armstead v. United States, 318 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1963); Thompson v.
United States, 318 F.2d 689 (6th Cir. 1963); United States v. Jenkins, 281 F.2d 193
(3d Cir. 1960). See also Williams v. United States, 307 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1962), which
held questions concerning admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search can be
reviewed on appeal, but not by collateral attack.
51 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). It should be noted that the Supreme
Court has yet to explicitly determine that search and seizure is a basis for collateral
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3. Denial of Counsel
The denial of an accused's right to counsel is a ground for collateral
relief in federal as well as state courts.5 2 However, there are two some-
what difficult problems in this area. The first concerns the question of
what is a valid waiver, and the second relates to cases in which the
petitioner alleges his counsel was incompetent. One may waive his right
to counsel, but unless the waiver is knowingly and understandingly
made, it is ineffective. 3 There is no precise test which a court may
employ in determining whether or not there has been an intelligent
waiver, and therefore the courts usually make this determination by
examining the circumstances under which the waiver was made. 4
attack. Granted that the four reasons for allowing the exclusionary rule in search and
seizure cases exist, there may be significant reasons for refusing to allow collateral relief.
First, most due process rights are intended to preserve the accuracy of the guilt-finding
process. The purpose is not achieved by the exclusionary rule in search and seizure.
Second, there is the possibility that these claims can be made in numerous situations. For
example, the claim could be the basis for collateral attack following a guilty plea, a trial,
or an appeal, even if the issue had not been raised at any earlier proceeding. See gen-
erally Amsterdam, "Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment," 112 U. Pa. L. Rev.
378 (1964).
52 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335 (1963).
53 United States v. Morgan, 222 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1955).
54 See Starks v. United States, 264 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1959). These circumstances
include prior experience of the defendant in court, the complexity of the offense, the
possible defenses to the charges, the defendant's ability to comprehend the nature and
substance of the charges against him, the care with which the court advised the defendant
of his right to counsel, and the importance of waiver in the particular situation. See also
United States v. Page, 229 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1956) (ability to comprehend the nature
and substance of the charges); Powell v. United States, 174 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1949)
(the care with which the court advised the defendant).
The trial judge may be required to make searching inquiries into each of these
elements, even when the defendant maintains that he does not desire counsel. In some
instances, this duty may mean that the trial judge must act as counsel would in explaining
the proceedings to the defendant. See Van Moltke v. Gillies, 332 US. 708 (1948). See
also Stachs v. United States, 264 F.2d 797, 799-800 (4th Cir. 1959). Of course, where
the circumstances show that the defendant either did not understand his rights, or did
not intelligently waive them, relief should be granted. A case in point is Arnold v.
United States, 271 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1959). The evidence at the § 2255 proceeding
showed that the clerk of courts asked the defendant whether he had an attorney, and
whether he wished the court to appoint one. The defendant became speechless and pointed
to the probation officer, then nodded his head indicating assent. The clerk, without further
explanation read the information and accepted the waiver of indictment and guilty plea.
The defendant had a mental condition at the time and appeared to be in need of treat-
ment. The Fourth Circuit held that the defendant had not been subjected to the searching
inquiry which must be made by the district court in order to determine whether there
has been an intelligent and competent waiver of his rights to counsel and further, this
duty could not be discharged in extrajudicial interviews by the probation officer.
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Closely related to the denial of counsel question is the problem
of incompetent or ineffective counsel. Lack of effective counsel is a
ground for collateral attack.5 However, the constitutional right to
counsel does not mean the defendant must have the services of an
attorney which meet any specific aptitude in point of professional skill.
For example, common mistakes of trial strategy which prove damag-
ing are not an adequate basis for attack on the competence of counsel. 6
Similarly, the mere fact that the accused was in good faith misled by
his counsel should not warrant a motion to vacate, unless the trial was
thereby reduced to a sham.57
An example of allegations sufficient to show incompetent counsel
appeared in Arellanes v. United States.58 The prisoner averred that he
discharged his attorney because of (1) an alleged total failure to
prepare for trial, and (2) counsel allegedly extorted funds from the
defendant and his family for the purpose of buying a dismissal of the
charges. The Ninth Circuit granted a hearing, saying: "If these most
serious accusations of professional misconduct be taken as true,
counsel's assistance was far from being constitutionally adequate .... 2 11
Before leaving the subject of counsel, it might be pointed out
that generally counsel may be required to be appointed to assist in the
preparation of a section 2255 petition even though the party so
moving fails to make such a request.60
4. Insanity at the Time of the Trial
Insanity at the time of the trial is within the scope of section 2255
and may be used as a ground to collaterally attack a sentence.6' It is
55 Frand v. United States, 301 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1962).
56 United States v. Duhart, 269 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1959). See Kapsalis v. United
States, 345 F.2d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 1965), where the court held that the petitioner was
not denied the effective assistance of counsel merely because of errors in trial strategy.
See also Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955).
57 See Frand v. United States, supra note 55, at 103.
58 326 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1964).
59 Id. at 561.
60 In Cerniglia v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 932, 936 (N.D. 11. 1964), the court
said counsel should be appointed, even where not requested, in all cases except those
where the motion is completely groundless. See Report, 33 F.R.D. 367, 385 (1963), which
states:
We think it would promote orderly procedure if the legislature also provided
appropriate legal assistance for inmates of Federal penal institutions in the
preparation of their § 2255 petitions. The effect of this would not be to increase
the number of such proceedings, but to enable the judge to determine more readily
which petitions merit hearings and which do not. Under the present practice,
frequently the judge feels constrained to order a hearing, fearing that there is
no other way to ascertain the nature and merits of the case.
See also Campbell v. United States, 318 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1963).
61 See Bishop v. United States, 350 US. 961 (1956), reversing 223 F.2d 582 (D.C.
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a principle of long standing that an insane man may not be tried for a
crime. 2 This principle is based on the belief that a defendant is
entitled to be present at all stages of his trial63 and that one who is
mentally incompetent "may be as far removed from the proceeding as
if physically absent."64 The movant's failure to urge this contention at
the time of his conviction does not prejudice his right to a hearing under
section 2255.65
While mental incompetence at the trial is a ground for relief,
mental incompetency at the time of the crime is not within the scope
of section 2255, and must be raised on appeal. 6
5. Convictions Based upon Perjured Testimony
The use of perjured testimony is within the scope of section 2255
if such testimony was procured with the knowledge of the govern-
ment.67 Two difficulties should be noted. First, the prisoner, bearing the
burden of proof, must not only show that the evidence was knowingly
and intelligently used by the government, but also that such testimony
was material.6 This is in contrast with the standard for evidence
Cir. 1955) ; Pledger v. United States, 272 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1959). Besides § 2255 relief,
a prisoner whose mental incompetency was undisclosed at the trial might also avail him-
self of 18 U.S.C. § 4245 (1951). There is authority that this procedure should be used
in lieu of § 2255. Nunley v. United States, 283 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1960).
62 Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934, 938 (4th Cir. 1963).
63 See Near v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1963); cf. Rakes v. United
States, 309 F.2d 686 (4th Cir. 1962).
64 Thomas v. Cunningham, supra note 62, at 938.
65 Taylor v. United States, 282 F.2d 17, 23 (8th Cir. 1960); Lee v. Whnan, 280
F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1960); Sanders v. United States, 205 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1953).
Insanity at the trial should also be a ground for collateral attack in Ohio, if the claim
has not been previously adjudicated (either at trial or on appeal), as procedural due
process requires that a state shall afford a defendant an adequate opportunity to raise
the issue. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 568, 570 (1953); Parnell v. Cunningham, 302
F.2d 633, 634 (4th Cir. 1962). Recently, drug addiction has been held to be a basis
for mental incompetency at the time of trial. Sanders v. United States, 373 US. 1 (1963).
Pleadings have been held to be factually sufficient to command a hearing. Meadows v.
United States, 282 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1960). The allegation that petitioner was placed
in a mental hospital following his trial [Gregori v. United States, 243 F.2d 48 (5th Cir.
1957)], or that the trial judge recommended psychiatric care [Praylow v. United States,
298 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1962)] have been held sufficient.
66 See Nunley v. United States, 283 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1960); United States v.
Lawrenson, 210 F. Supp. 422, 429 (D. Md. 1962).
67 United States v. Barillas, 291 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1961). For a discussion of per-
jured testimony, see Murray, "Convictions Obtained by Perjured Testimony: A Compara-
tive View," 27 Ohio St. L.J. 102 (1966). The rule apparently originated in Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
68 Emzor v. United States, 296 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Spadafora,
200 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1952).
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which is the product of an illegal search and seizure, where the ques-
tion is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence
complained of might have contributed to the conviction. 9 Second, the
courts have sometimes been strict in requiring detailed and specific
factual allegations in the motion.70 This may put an even greater
burden on the prisoner, for evidence may be unavailable.
Each of these difficulties place an extreme burden on one alleging
perjured testimony as a ground for relief. While there may be valid
reasons for requiring that the perjury relate to material evidence and
that the pleadings be detailed and specific, the requirements that the
government knowingly use such evidence seems unreasonable. The
fact that the defendant may be imprisoned for a crime which he did
not commit cannot be ignored. Further, the fact that the perjured
testimony was unwittingly used by the prosecutor does not change
the fact that there was government action in indicting, trying, and
convicting the defendant.71
It would seem that there are two possible solutions to this prob-
lem. First, the courts could simply dispense with the "knowledge"
requirement by overruling the cases which make it a necessary element
of the cause of action. Second, if the courts failed to act, the legislature
could provide that the defendant's proving of "knowing use" by the
prosecution was unnecessary. These suggestions are urged on the as-
sumption that perjured testimony voids the conviction. With this as a
premise, it necessarily follows that a means of correcting this error is
available.
6. Denial of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The fifth amendment provides the petitioner with the privilege
against self-incrimination when called to testify.7" A denial of this
69 Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
70 See Note, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 788, 794-96 (1963).
71 See Murray, "Convictions Obtained by Perjured Testimony: A Comparative
View," 27 Ohio St. L.J. 102, 107 (1966), where the author stated:
There is also a practical objection .... It is unrealistic in most cases to
expect the police or the prosecuting attorneys to admit that they knew the
testimony was perjured when it was introduced; it is even more unrealistic to
expect that they will admit this fact when they were the instigators of the per-
jured testimony for an admission in either case might subject them to criminal
or disciplinary proceedings. As a result, even though there may be no question
that perjured testimony was used, it is virtually impossible to prove the knowl-
edge of the prosecuting authorities because it will be the word of a confessed
perjurer against the word of authorities.
72 See McCormick, Evidence 288-90 (1954); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2251 (3d ed.
1940). See generally Orfield, "The Privilege Against Self Incrimination in Federal Cases,"
25 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 503 (1964).
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privilege voids the conviction and is within the scope of section 2255
relief.
The privilege applies in numerous circumstances. 73 One of the
most important situations is where the prosecutor comments upon the
defendant's silence.74
7. Coerced Confessions
Closely akin to the problem of self-incrimination is that of coerced
confessions. A conviction based on a coerced confession is within the
scope of collateral attack in federal court as well as in Ohio.75 These
confessions void the convictions because they are unreliable evidence,
and because of their deterrent effect on improper police interrogation.76
A serious question in this area concerns confessions which are
obtained by an unlawful delay prior to a preliminary hearing. There
is dicta to the effect that if the prisoner is prejudiced by an unlawful
delay and a confession therefrom, a ground for collateral relief might
exist.7 7 However, absent a showing of real prejudice, the admission
of a confession at a plenary trial which was the result of an unlaw-
ful delay may not be a ground for collateral attack. 8
73 See Orfield, supra note 72, at 506-07.
74 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which held that neither the prose-
cutor nor judge may adversely comment upon defendant's failure to testify. But see
Tehan v. Shott, 86 S. Ct. 459 (1966), which held that Griffin shall not be given retro-
spective application. The privilege against self-incrimination applies in state courts [See
Griffin v. California, 380 US. 609 (1965)], and should therefore be a ground in Ohio
under § 2953.21 for post-conviction relief.
75 Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
76 See Note, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 313, 314 (1964). An example of a coerced confession
would be one which was obtained after the administration of a "truth serum." Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Another would be one which was obtained after a state-
ment by an arresting officer that defendant's children would not be taken from her if
she "cooperated" [Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963)], or the defendant would not
be allowed to call his wife until he "cooperated" [Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503
(1963)].
77 Kristiansand v. United States, 319 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1963).
78 See Hodges v. United States, 282 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 365
U.S. 810, cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 368 U.S. 139 (1961). This seems to
be the general rule in Ohio as well. See Caldwell v. Hoskins, 176 Ohio St. 261, 199 N.E.2d
116 (1964). Such a rule lies in the assumption that this irregularity did not harm the
defendant. This presumption might be valid when the record reflects the defendant knew
and understood that the illegal confession could not be used, but seems less than satis-
factory if the defendant is not fully aware of this fact. Entering a plea of guilty, when
one believes he will be convicted by means of his confession, seems somewhat less than
voluntary. This illustrates the importance of insuring that the accused is aware of his
rights. For a discussion of coerced confessions, see generally, Ritz, "Twenty-Five Years
of State Criminal Confession Cases in the U.S. Supreme Court," 19 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
35 (1962); Comment, "The Coerced Confessions Cases in Search of a Rationale," 31
U. Chi. L. Rev. 313 (1964).
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8. Denial of a Fair and Speedy Trial
One has a constitutional right to a fair and speedy trial, and a
denial of such voids a conviction. However, before a delay becomes
unconstitutional, it must be arbitrary and oppressive under the cir-
cumstances." In determining if the delay was arbitrary or oppressive,
the courts make use of the following policy considerations: (1) a
speedy trial avoids prolonged imprisonment of the accused if he
remains in jail until the trial; (2) a speedy trial relieves the accused
from the anxiety and public suspicion to which he is subjected by the
accusation of the crime; (3) a speedy trial prevents the accused from
being tried so long after the alleged events that the means of establish-
ing his innocence are no longer available to him."
Each of these three factors should be considered anytime a denial
of the right to a speedy trial is alleged. For example, a period of a
two-years wait before trial may be arbitrary and oppressive in one
instance,8" and not in another.82
III. RES JUDICATA IN SUBSEQUENT APPLICATIONS
Prior to the decisions in Sanders v. United States, 3 there was some
confusion concerning when a court might refuse on res judicata
grounds a second application for relief. 4 This confusion terminated in
Sanders when the Court announced the following guidelines:
1. Successive Motions on Grounds Previously Heard and Determined
A denial of relief may result where the same ground85 presented
in the subsequent motion was determined on the merits in the prior
application adversely to the movant88
79 Waugaman v. United States, 331 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1964).
80 Koenig v. Willingham, 324 F.2d 62 (6th Cir. 1963).
81 Waugaman v. United States, supra note 79.
82 Koenig v. Willingham, supra note 80.
83 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
84 Id. at 6-8.
85 The Court defined "ground" to mean a legal basis for relief. The same ground
can be proved by different sets of circumstances, and if doubts arise as to whether two
grounds are different or the same, such doubts should be resolved in favor of the peti-
tioner. 373 U.S. at 16.
86 The earlier denial must have rested on the merits of the ground presented in the
subsequent motion. If relief was not denied because the files and records of the case
conclusively showed the motion to be without merit, the earlier denial rested on the
merits. 373 U.S. at 16. Where the same ground has earlier been rejected on the merits,
the petitioner may still have a hearing. However, in such cases, the burden is upon the
prisoner to show that the ends of justice will be served only if his case is redetermined.
Where factual issues are involved, the prisoner is entitled to a hearing if he can show
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2. The Successive Application Claimed to be an Abuse of the Remedy
No matter how many prior applications for federal collateral relief
have been made, the movant is not barred from subsequent applica-
tions if: (1) he urges a different ground in the new application; or
(2) the same ground if his earlier motion was not adjudicated on the
merits. In either situation, full consideration of the new application
can be avoided only if the government can show there has been an
abuse of the remedy. 7
The district judge has the discretion to deny the hearing as to
those allegations which were raised earlier, or could have been, but
were not raised in the earlier proceedings, unless the petitioner has
some justification for not raising the issue on his earlier motion, such
as being unaware of the significance of the relevant facts." In the
respect to the issues which were known and could have been raised,
but were intentionally omitted, res judicata applies.
CONCLUSION
Generally, the federal grounds under section 2255 are those which
were available under habeas corpus. These grounds are those which
void the conviction because the conviction was obtained in violation
of the constitutional rights of the defendant. The more important of
these grounds are: (1) the coerced plea of guilty, (2) evidence
obtained by illegal search and seizure, (3) the denial of counsel, (4)
insanity at the time of the trial, (5) convictions based upon perjured
testimony, (6) the privilege against self-incrimination, (7) the coerced
confession, and (8) the right to a fair and speedy trial. Each of these
grounds should be recognized as a basis for relief in Ohio.89 At the same
the first case was not fair. If the issue involved is a legal issue, the prisoner may be
entitled to a new hearing upon showing an intervening change in the law or some other
reason for having failed to raise a key issue in the earlier proceeding. 373 US. at 16-17.
87 For example, if the applicant deliberately withheld a ground for relief at the
time of filing his first application in the hope of being granted two hearings rather than
one, he waives his right to a second hearing on the withheld ground. 373 U.S. at 18.
88 See, e.g., Hayes v. United States, 323 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Burgess v. United
States, 319 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Bent v. United States, 308 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1962);
Gant v. United States, 308 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1962); Lipscomb v. United States, 298
F.2d 9 (8th Cir. 1962); Birchfield v. United States, 296 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1961); Fiano
v. United States, 291 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1961); Hamilton v. Wilkinson, 271 F.2d 278
(5th Cir. 1959).
89 See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) (coerced plea of guilty);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643 (1961) (evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.. 335 (1963) (denial of counsel); Ohio Const. art. I, § 10
(insanity at the time of trial); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (convictions
based on perjured testimony); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against
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time, grounds relating to ordinary matters of procedure such as errors
in the indictment, rulings on evidence, as well as matters relating to
the guilt or innocence of the accused, probably will not be grounds
for relief in Ohio, since such defects do not void the conviction on
any constitutional ground.
Paul A. Bernardini
self-incrimination) ; Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (coerced confession) ; Ohio Const.
art. I, § 10 (fair and speedy trial).
